Shareholder inspection rights form an important tool for shareholder protection. They offer shareholders seeking information private access to specific books and records of the company that are otherwise not publicly available. While there has been a discourse on the topic in some jurisdictions such as Delaware (USA), it has not received scholarly treatment at an international level. This Research Handbook seeks to alter that, and signifies the first endeavor to engage in a comprehensive and comparative analysis of shareholder inspection rights across 19 different jurisdictions representing five continents. Themes emerging from the study include the historical evolution of inspection rights, the statutory design of the inspection regime, how inspection rights interact with disclosure norms under securities regulation, and the manner in which inspection rights are actually utilized by shareholders. While there is some commonality among jurisdictions, the larger story is one of divergence, which is understandable since local needs tend to drive the design and operation of the regime. The Research Handbook on Shareholder Inspection Rights is invaluable to academics, scholars, and students working the area of corporate law and governance, legal practitioners working in corporate law and, in particular, shareholder litigation and regulators and government bodies overseeing the corporate sector, including corporate and securities regulators.

Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches - managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory - and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, this Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business, and accounting. Contributors: C. Amatucci, R. Bender, S. Bhagat, W. Bratton, S. Chahine, R. Chakrabarti, M.J. Conyon, G. Ferrarini, M. Firth, M. Goergen, B. Haar, L. He, M.T. Henderson, J.G. Hill, K. Kubo, T.Y. Leung, G. Loutzenhiser, M. Lubrano di Scorpaniello, J.A. McCahery, N. Moloney, K.J. Murphy, L. Oxelheim, L. Renneboog, R. Romano, O.M. Rui, Z. Sautner, K. Sheehan, K. Subramanian, R.S. Thomas, S. Thompson, G. Trojanowski, H. Wells, C. Wihlborg, J. Winter, P.K. Yadav, Y. Yadav, J. Zhang

The most pressing challenge in corporate governance today is figuring out how to modulate the power given to public investors. Too little is harmful, but so is too much. Finding the sweet spot is very tricky. This Research Handbook makes the quest a little easier. It collects in one place a set of thoughtful and provocative essays, authored by leading academic experts from around the world, on a range of topics related to corporate governance and the power of shareholders. Very highly recommended.' - Jesse Fried, Harvard Law School, US'The Research Handbook on Shareholder Power offers a state-of-the-art collection of original essays on the most profound development in corporate governance in recent decades: the growth of shareholder power as against managerial dominance. From the 1960s through at least the mid-1980s one would hear only cries bemoaning shareholder vulnerability. Managers were in control. Today it is at least as common to hear complaints by managers that they are being persecuted by activist shareholders. The reader of the Handbook will come away with an acute understanding of how and why this happened, and how all this reverberates in countries.' - Donald C. Langevoort, Georgetown University, US 'Edward Elgar's Research Handbook on Shareholder Power is an excellent collection of essays by leading scholars in the fields of corporate law and corporate governance. Professors Hill and Thomas are to be commended for delivering this valuable and timely volume on a fascinating and crucial topic.' - Brian Cheffins, University of Cambridge, UK Much of the history of corporate law has concerned itself not with shareholder power, but rather with its absence. Recent shifts in capital market structure require a reassessment of the role and power of shareholders. These original, specially commissioned contributions by leading scholars in corporate law and financial economics provide a contemporary analysis of shareholder power and consider the regulatory consequences of changing ownership patterns around the world. The book begins with chapters on shareholder activism by institutional investors, hedge funds, and controlling shareholders. Further chapters explore the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors, shareholder activism around mergers and acquisitions, and turf battles during shareholder litigation. The final section offers a number of international perspectives on shareholder power in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Students and scholars of corporate law will value the Handbook's timely exploration of modern shareholder power as well as its fresh perspective and scope. Contributors: S. Bainbridge, M. Becht, M. Belcredi, M.M. Blair, J.C. Coates, J.D. Cox, P. Davies, P.H. Edelman, T. Eguchi, L. Enriques, G. Ferrarini, F. Ferri, M. Filippelli, J. Franks, G.S. Geis, R.J. Gilson, J.N. Gordon, E. Gorga, J. Grant, L. Guo, G. Heng, J.G. Hill, K.S. Kim, L.L. Lan, R.W. Masulis, C. Mayer, F. Partnoy, P.K.Pham, E. Pikulina, D. Puchniak, L. Renneboog, W.G. Ringe, Z. Shishido, M.M. Siems, R.S. Thomas, R.B. Thompson, U. Varottil, H. Wells, J. Zein

Economic activity is more globally integrated than ever before, but so is the scope of corporate misconduct. As more and more people across the world are affected by such malfeasance, the differences in legal redress have become increasingly visible. This transparency has resulted in a growing convergence towards an American model of robust private enforcement of the law, including the class-action lawsuit. This handbook brings together scholars from nearly two dozen countries to describe and assess the class-action procedure (or its equivalent) in their respective countries and, where possible, to offer empirical data on these systems. At the same time, the work presents a variety of multidisciplinary perspectives on class actions, from economics to philosophy, making this handbook an essential resource to academics, lawyers, and policymakers alike.

Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches - managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory - and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, this Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business, and accounting. Contributors: C. Amatucci, R. Bender, S. Bhagat, W. Bratton, S. Chahine, R. Chakrabarti, M.J. Conyon, G. Ferrarini, M. Firth, M. Goergen, B. Haar, L. He, M.T. Henderson, J.G. Hill, K. Kubo, T.Y. Leung, G. Loutzenhiser, M. Lubrano di Scorpaniello, J.A. McCahery, N. Moloney, K.J. Murphy, L. Oxelheim, L. Renneboog, R. Romano, O.M. Rui, Z. Sautner, K. Sheehan, K. Subramanian, R.S. Thomas, S. Thompson, G. Trojanowski, H. Wells, C. Wihlborg, J. Winter, P.K. Yadav, Y. Yadav, J. Zhang

Economic activity is more globally integrated than ever before, but so is the scope of corporate misconduct. As more and more people across the world are affected by such malfeasance, the differences in legal redress have become increasingly visible. This transparency has resulted in a growing convergence towards an American model of robust private enforcement of the law, including the class-action lawsuit. This handbook brings together scholars from nearly two dozen countries to describe and assess the class-action procedure (or its equivalent) in their respective countries and, where possible, to offer empirical data on these systems. At the same time, the work presents a variety of multidisciplinary perspectives on class actions, from economics to philosophy, making this handbook an essential resource to academics, lawyers, and policymakers alike.